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Abstract:  
Securitization is one of the most important innovations in financial markets. It is a 
process of converting illiquid loans that cannot be sold readily to third-party investors 
into liquid securities and selling them to dispersed investors. As a result, securitization 
improves liquidity in capital markets by allowing originators to remove the issued loans 
from its balance sheet and use the proceeds for other purposes or even to originate new 
loans. In spite of all its advantages, securitization is often suspected of being one of the 
main reasons for the recent financial crisis. One concern that is frequently raised in the 
literature is that securitization leads to moral hazard in lender screening and monitoring. 
By selling loans to investors and removing them from their books, banks have a lesser 
incentive to carefully evaluate and monitor borrowers’ credit quality to ensure that they 
can repay the loans, because the risk of delinquencies falls on investors rather than 
lenders. One problem in the literature is that the analysis of securitization is very general 
and suffers from a lack a specific security design analysis under asymmetric information. 
We address the moral hazard problem using a principal-agent model where the investor 
is the principal and the lender is the agent. We show that the optimal contract must 
contain a retention clause in the presence of moral hazard. 
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1. Introduction 
Securitization is one of the most important innovations in financial markets. It is the process of pooling financial 
assets such as debt instruments and individual loans and then packaging and converting them into securities and 
selling them in the form of tranches (prioritized capital structure of claims) or other credit enhancement to third-
party investors (Kendall and Fishman, 2000). In other words, securitization is a process of converting illiquid loans 
that cannot be sold readily to third-party investors into liquid securities and selling them to dispersed investors. As 
a result, securitization improves liquidity in capital markets by allowing originators to remove the issued loans 
from their balance sheet and use the proceeds for other purposes or even to originate new loans (Coval, Jurek, and 
Stafford, 2009; Demarzo, 2005). Because of the attractiveness of securitization for financial market participants, 
its application has widely been extended in  recent years. In April 2011, the volume of outstanding securitized 
assets reached $11 trillion, which is substantially greater than the overall outstanding marketable US Treasury 
securities of $8 trillion (US Department of the Treasury, 2011).  
In spite of all its advantages, securitization is often suspected of being one of the main reasons for the recent 
financial crisis. One concern that is frequently raised in the literature is that securitization leads to moral hazard in 
lender screening and monitoring (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Parlour and Plantin, 2008; Berndt and Gupta, 
2009; Brunnermeier, 2009; Mian and Sufi, 2009; Selody and Woodman, 2009; Fender and Mitchell, 2009a; 
Rajan, 2010; Donnelly and Embrechts, 2010; Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig 2010; 2011). By selling loans to 
investors and removing them from their books, banks have a lesser incentive to carefully evaluate and monitor 
borrowers’ credit quality to ensure that they can repay the loans, because the risk of delinquencies falls on 
investors rather than lenders. Securitization changes screening and monitoring behavior and raises information 
asymmetry between lenders and investors. The resulting information asymmetry may be costly to the investors, 
because of the distance between borrowers and investors. The benefits of securitization are thus limited by 
information asymmetry between lenders and investors and in particular by the costs of this non-transparency. It is 
becoming important for regulators and market participants to understand the costs and benefits of securitization so 
that they can appropriately improve the incentives and scope of securitization to mitigate this information cost.  
Tranche retention seems to be a wise solution to solve the moral hazard problem of securitization. It is now used 
frequently by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO, 2009; US Treasury, 2009; 
European Parliament, 2009) to revitalize securitization markets. To maintain incentives to screen and monitor 
loans, it seems logical to require lenders to retain part of securitized loans so that they remain exposed to the risk. 
One problem is that the analysis of securitization is very general and suffers from a lack of specific security design 
analysis under asymmetric information. In other words, there is not yet in the literature an optimal model that 
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endogenously specifies the exact form and amount of optimal retention to keep the lender’s incentive at the 
optimal level.  
We are among the first to investigate the optimal security design of structured products under moral hazard. Our 
goal is to address the moral hazard problem using a principal-agent model where the investor is the principal and 
the lender is the agent. Without securitization, all the costs and benefits of screening and monitoring are internal to 
the lender and incentive to screen and monitor is optimal. With securitization, originators sell part of their risk to a 
third party, and do not bear the full cost of loan default. The more the investors contribute to covering the default 
cost, the less incentive lenders have to carefully screen and monitor borrowers. In Section 2, we propose our 
principal-agent model and in Section 3 we show how to mitigate moral hazard in screening and monitoring by 
specifying the optimal amount of the loan pool that lenders should hold to maintain their incentive under ex ante 
moral hazard. Section 4 concludes the analysis. 
 
2. The model 
We consider a risk-averse originator or bank that detains a loan pool with a value normalized to 1. The loan pool is 
assumed to be large enough to diversify away the idiosyncratic risk. The originator could keep these loans in the 
balance sheet or securitize them to risk-neutral and competitive investors. The risk-free rate of interest is 
normalized to zero. We assume that the average default probability of loan pool is )(ep , which is a function of 
the screening and monitoring effort  ee ,0 . Effort e could be undertaken by lenders to decrease the 
probability of loan default. We assume )(ep  is decreasing and convex in effort: 
      10,0,0  pepep  and   .0ep  (1) 
Effort is costly for originators. The cost function is equal to  eC  and is increasing and convex in e : 
      .0,0,00  eCeCC  (2) 
 In the case of loan default there is a random conditional loss L, which is in the interval [0 , 1] : 10  L , with 
distribution function )( LF  and density function )( Lf .  F is the distribution of loss, conditional on default. In 
this article we assume that effort decreases the probability of default without changing the conditional distribution
)( LF .  
We assume that there is only one tranche and there is no credit enhancement procedure in the securitization. In this 
case the special purpose vehicle issues financial assets that are not prioritized and are simply fractional claims to 
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the payoff on the underlying portfolio. Because the expected portfolio loss is equal to the mean expected loss on 
the underlying securities, the average portfolio’s credit rating is given by the average rating of the securities in the 
underlying pool (Coval, Jurek, and Stafford, 2009). 
 
The rate of return on the loan pool is R, which is assumed positive: R>0.  In the presence of securitization, we 
assume that the originator can securitize part of the loan pool and keep a fraction   of the loans (retention). We 
also assume that the originator’s decision to securitize or not is made at the same time as loan origination. After 
securitization, originators can choose their monitoring effort level. Monitoring effort cannot be observed by 
investors. Another interpretation would be that the average risk is evaluated by a rating agency that does not 
observe effort. Therefore, it cannot be contractible. Our objective is to find the optimal  . 
Securitization generates liquidity for the originator prior to the loan’s maturity. As mentioned previously, we 
assume that third-party investors are competitive. Thus the amount they are willing to pay is equal to the expected 
value of their payoff from the securitized loans. If the originator securitizes the entire loan pool, it will receive a 
return equal to 1+ S.  S is the rate of return on the loan pool that takes into account the potential default risk of the 
loan pool. Therefore S is smaller than or equal to R. The difference between R and S is considered as the sum of 
transferred expected loss to investors plus the risk premium.  The risk premium is the maximum amount that a 
risk-averse originator is willing to pay above the transferred expected loss to eliminate the default risk of the loan 
pool by transferring it to the market. If the originator keeps a   fraction of the loan pool, it will receive 
)1)(1( S  from securitization.  
Investors’ objective function 
The objective of the model is to maximize the expected return of the investors under different constraints. In the 
non-default state the investors’ return is equal to )1)(1( R  , because they have only )1(  fraction of the 
entire loan pool. If the loan pool defaults, the  fraction kept by the originator absorbs initial losses until it is 
completely exhausted. Therefore, if the loss amount is small enough that it does not consume the entire  fraction, 
the investor loses nothing. If the amount of loss is large enough to exhaust the  fraction, investors’ expected loss 
is equal to  1 )()1)((  dLLfRL . The investors’ objective function is then equal to:  
          .1)(1 1    dLLfRLepSRI  (3) 
 
With full securitization, when 0 , the investors’ objective function is reduced to: 
.)()1()()(
1
0  dLLfRLepSRI  (4) 
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We are looking for the optimal retention in the case of securitization that will keep the originator’s incentive at the 
most favorable level. First we assume that there is no securitization and calculate the originator’s first best effort . 
Then we assume that there is securitization, while effort is observable and there is no moral hazard. In this case, 
given the first best effort level, we determine the optimal amount of retention. Finally we investigate the optimal 
amount of retention with moral hazard.   We must consider three kinds of constraints in this model:
  participation constraint 
 incentive compatibility constraint 
 technology constraint 
 
 Participation constraint 
The originator’s welfare in the case of securitization should be greater than or equal to its welfare in the case of no 
securitization. We assume the originator is risk averse, so its marginal utility of wealth is decreasing in wealth: 
0)(,0)(  wUwU , where w  is final wealth. This assumption is not critical to the result regarding the 
optimal form of contract : we obtain similar results when investors are risk averse or in a limited liability 
framework. 
In the absence of securitization, the originator holds the entire loan pool on its balance sheet and screens and 
monitors the loans cautiously. In this case the originator’s payoff when there is no default will be )( RU , and if 
there is default, it will be      10 1 dLLfRLRU  . Its expected utility is given by: 
              .11 1
0
eCdLLfRLRUepRUepO    (5) 
From the first-order condition with respect to e , we calculate the first best effort that the originator can put forth 
to maximize its expected utility in the absence of securitization. This condition is equal to: 
 
    .)()())1((1
0 

   RUdLLfRLRUepeC  (6) 
The solution is e . The second-order condition is negative at the optimum. Details are in Appendix (A.1). 
Without securitization, the originator exerts the first best effort to maximize the expected utility that can be 
calculated by inserting the first best effort level in the originator’s expected utility as follows: 
            .)(11 1
0
UeCdLLfRLRUepRUep     (7) 
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U  is the best opportunity when considering securitization. To satisfy the participation constraint, the originator’s 
expected utility in the presence of securitization should be at least equal to U .   
In the case of securitization, we can write the originator’s expected utility as follows: 
       
                 .)1())(1(11
11
1
0
eCdLLfRSRRUdLLfRLSRRUep
SRRUep


 

  
  (8) 
))(1( SRR   is the originator’s payoff in the state of non-default. The expected return on the entire loan pool 
is (1+R), but because the originator keeps only the   fraction of the loan pool, it will receive the   fraction of 
the return: )1( R . For the rest of the loan pool, the originator will receive: )1)(1( S from securitization. 
Summing up these returns yields the payoff: ))(1( SRR   . 
In the case of default, because the  fraction is exhausted first, the expected utility is equal to: 
   .)())1())(1(()())1(1( 1
0     dLLfRSRRUdLLfRLSRRU  (9) 
If the loss amount is less than  , the originator loses: )1( RL  . When the loss amount is greater than , the 
originator loses ).1( R The probability of the first alternative is equal to: .)(1)( 1  dLLfF  
To obtain the participation constraint, we equate the expected utility in the case of securitization to the expected 
utility in the case of no securitization while exerting the first best effort. We assume that this constraint is binding. 
We assign  as the Lagrange multiplier to the originator’s participation constraint: 
       
          .)()1())(1()1())(1(
11
1
0
UeCdLLfRSRRUdLLfRLSRRUep
SRRUep


 

  
  (10) 
The left-hand side  of  this constraint must be evaluated at the optimal effort under securitization. We must now 
compute the optimal effort by analyzing the incentive compatibility constraint under securitization. 
 Incentive compatibility constraint:  
This constraint ensures the effectiveness of the originator’s screening and monitoring  effort under moral hazard. 
By differentiating the originator’s expected utility in the presence of securitization with respect to screening and 
monitoring effort (first-order condition for choice of effort), we can obtain the incentive compatibility constraint as 
follows: 
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             .0))(1(
)1())(1()1())(1(
0
1
* 




   eC
SRRU
dLLfRSRRUdLLfRLSRRU
ep

   (11) 
We assign  as a Lagrange multiplier of this constraint. When  0 (full securitization), the marginal benefit of 
effort is equal to zero: 
                 01
)1())(1()1(1
1
0 




 
SRRU
dLLfRSRRUdLLfRLSRRU
ep

 

 
(12) 
Because the marginal cost )(  eC  is positive, the first-order condition is strictly negative; as a result e  is equal to 
zero. 
 Technology constraint: 
This constraint can be applied to ensure that there is no oversecuritization. It excludes 1 . 0 is the 
multiplier of this constraint. 




10
101 
  (13) 
 
3. Optimal securitization 
Optimal securitization solves the following principal-agent program: 
       
                
       
         
1:
)()1())(1()1())(1(
11:
0
1
)1()()1()()1(1
:
)1()(1
1
1
0
0
1
1
,,



 









 














UeCdLLfRSRRUdLLfRLSRRUep
SRRUep
eC
SRRU
dLLfRSRRUdLLfRLSRRU
ep
RdLLfLepSRMax
eS
 
(14) 
 No Moral Hazard:  =0 
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First we assume that  =0  when there is no moral hazard and  ee . The investor checks e and sets its level at 
e  by using the "take it or leave it" strategy. If we differentiate (14) with respect to S, we have: 
    
        .0)(1)1())(1()(1)1())(1()(
1))(1()(1)1(:
0
1 

 

   

dLLfRSRRUdLLfRLSRRUep
SRRUepS
 
(15) 
By solving the above equation, we can isolate 1  as follows: 
   
  .)())1())(1(()())1())(1((
))(1()(11
0
1


 

   

dLLfRSRRUdLLfRLSRRUep
SRRUep  
(16) 
 
Differentiating (14) with respect to yields: 
            
              .)(11)1())(1()1())(1()(
))(1()(111)(
0



FSRSRRUepdLLfSRRLSRRUep
SRSRRUepRFepSR



 (17) 
By solving this equation for 1 , we obtain: 
 
                   








  RFepSR
FSRSRRUep
dLLfSRRLSRRUep
SRSRRUep
1)(1)(
)(11)1())(1(
)1())(1()(
)()))(1(()(1
1
0 


 
 
(18) 
By equalizing the two equations (16) and (18)  together we get the following result: 
))1())(1(())(1)(()())1())(1(()(
)))(1(())(1())1())(1((
0
RSRRUFepdLLfRLSRRUep
SRRUepRSRRU


 

  
(19) 
 =0  solves this equation. We can also verify that R>S at the optimum. From the participation constraint we have 
the following relationship: 
 
                .)1()(1( 1
0
 

   eCdLLfRLRUepRUepeCSU  (20) 
By applying Taylor expansion to both side of equation (20), we obtain the expected loss and the risk premium: 
     dLLfRLRU RUepdLLLfRepRS )()1()( )()(21)()1()( 221010  
 
(21) 
Details are in Appendix (A.2). 
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Because the risk premium is positive, we can verify that: 
          101 dLLLfRepSR  
The investor uses its power to extract the risk premium from the risk-averse bank. Under risk neutrality, )( SR 
is equal to expected loss. 
 Moral Hazard : 0  
Now we assume that 0  because there is potential moral hazard. Differentiating (14) with respect to S, we 
obtain after simplification: 
 
 
    







 )(1)1())(1()()1())(1(
))(1(
)()(
))(1(1
0





FRSRRUdLLfRLSRRU
SRRU
epep
SRRU
 
(22) 
Differentiating (14) with respect to  yields, after simplification: 
 
         










 


0
)()()1()()1(
)1()1()()1()(1)()()1(
)()(
)())(1()1())(1)(()(
dLLfSRRLSRRU
SRSRRUFSRSRRU
epep
SRSRRURFepSR
 
(23) 
The two first-order conditions can be rewritten as: 
 
))1())(1(())(1)(()())1())(1(()(
)))(1(())()3(())1())(1((
0 RSRRUFepdLLfRLSRRUep
SRRUepURSRRU


 

  
(24) 
Where )3())1())(1(( URSRRU    
We analyze two cases. First consider 
)3(
1
U  : 
 
))1())(1(())(1)(()())1())(1(()(
)))(1(())(1())1())(1((
0 RSRRUFepdLLfRLSRRUep
SRRUepRSRRU


 


 (25) 
Because U   is decreasing in wealth, this means that   should be smaller than or equal to zero to solve (25). 
Because    cannot be smaller than zero, this means that there should be full securitization. By putting 0 in 
the above equation we get the following result: 
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  )()())(1)(()())(1()( SUSUFepSUepSU    (26) 
which is a contradiction because 0)0( F   and we reject this possibility. 
 
Now considering 
)3(
1
U   , we obtain: 
 
))1())(1(())(1)(()())1())(1(()(
)))(1(())(1())1())(1((
0 RSRRUFepdLLfRLSRRUep
SRRUepRSRRU


 

  
(27) 
Because U   is decreasing in wealth, this means that   should be greater than zero to solve this inequality. This 
implies that full securitization is not optimal and there must be retention under moral hazard. The optimal solution, 
0*  , means that: 
L Investor loss = 0*  ,when investor loss is greater than zero, which means 1*   . Therefore: 
Investor loss = 0* L ; If *L : Investor loss = 0; If *L : Investor loss = *L . 
Finally, we obtain that full retention can also be an optimal solution. 
Based on the above result, we can show the relationship between investor and portfolio loss in the following 
figure:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Investor loss 
L 0 *  1 
Loan portfolio loss
Full securitization
Partial securitization 
 under moral hazard 
Figure 1 
Investor loss equals 0 when *L and equals *L when *L . 
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we applied the security design methodology to securitization to obtain the optimal risk sharing 
between sellers and buyers of these products. To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first to analyze the 
incentive contracting of securitized products under moral hazard. We prove that the optimal contract must contain 
a partial retention clause in the presence of moral hazard. The optimal amount of retention could then be 
calculated using our model with different parameter values. We can take one step further by considering structured 
asset-backed securitization with both the absence and the presence of the correlation between assets in the original 
pool. These correlations were not considered before the recent financial crisis, which led to underestimation of true 
default probabilities of tranches in the presence of systemic risk. This also resulted in the inaccurate rating of the 
financial products associated with different tranches.  
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Appendix A 
A.1 Second-order condition 
The second-order condition is negative at the optimum: 0)(,0)(  epeC  and RRLR  )1(  implies 
that   10 )()()1( RUdLLfRLRU  is negative. As a result we verify the negativity of the S.O.C:   
 
0)()())1(()()(
1
0


   RUdLLfRLRUepeC  
(A.1) 
 
A.2 Risk premium when there is no moral hazard 
We can verify that R>S and by calculating the difference between R and S we can calculate the risk premium. 
From the participation constraint we have the following: 
   
    )()())1())(1(()()1())(1(
))(1()(1
1
0
eCdLLfRSRRUdLLfRLSRRUep
SRRUepU


 

  

 
(A.2) 
When there is no securitization ( =0), the originator will exert the first best effort level e , and the right-hand 
side of the above equation is equal to: 
)()(  eCSU   (A.3) 
The originator’s expected utility without securitization while the originator exerts the first best effort is equal to: 
    )()()1()()()(1 10    eCdLLfRLRUepRUep  (A.4) 
Equalizing these two equations yields the following equality from the participation constraint: 
      10 )()()1()()()(1)()( eCdLLfRLRUepRUepeCSU  (A.5) 
We can calculate the risk premium by applying a Taylor expansion around R to both sides of equation (A.5). The 
Taylor expansion of  the left side of this equation is equal to: 
The Taylor expansion of the right side of equation (A.5) is equal to: 
     
2
)(1)()()(1)()()()()(1
1
0
221
0
UdLLfRLepRUdLLfRLepRUepRUep



 

    (A.7) 
)()()()( RURSRUSU   (A.6) 
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Equalizing these two equations yields the following: 
 
  10 2210 )()()1()( )()(21)()1)(( LdLfRLRU RUepdLLLfRepRS  (A.8) 
 
Where the risk premium =
  
 dLLfRL
RU
RUep )()1(
)(
)()(
2
1 221
0
 
  
(A.9) 
 
  
Under risk aversion, the risk premium is positive because  0)(,0)(,0)(  RURUep . Therefore, we can 
conclude that  R-S is larger than the expected loss. The expected return of originator is then equal to: 
   10 2210 )()()1()( )()(21)1()()(11 LdLfRLRU RUepRdLLLfepS  (A.10) 
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